Research Alert

Abstract

News — Many e-commerce platforms have adopted certification programs for sellers and even introduced a multi-certification strategy, enabling consumers to more easily identify high-quality sellers. Using signaling theory, we explore the effectiveness of such multi-certification strategy; that is, whether subsequent additional platform certifications can strengthen the signaling effect of high-quality sellers and thus improve their performance. This study also examines the moderating effect of quality signals from other sources. We obtain a seller dataset from China’s largest e-commerce platform (), and, leveraging a quasi-natural experiment based on changes in platform certification status, combine difference-in-differences models and propensity score matching to test our hypotheses. We find that the signaling effects of platform certification are complicated and negatively moderated by seller reputation and shop tenure. In particular, additional certifications enhance performance only if sellers have low reputation or short shop tenure. The results enrich the signaling theory and suggest practical implications for platform governance.